Why are animals cognitive? by Byrne, Richard W & Bates, Lucy A
Why are animals cognitive? 
 
Richard W. Byrne & Lucy A. Bates 
 
Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, and Scottish Primate Research Group, School of Psychology, University 
of St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, Scotland.  
The study of animal behaviour has revealed many intricate ways in which individuals deal adaptively with 
their world, some of which raise controversial issues of interpretation. Scrub jays, for instance, adjust their 
food-hiding according to the likely competition from other jays. If a competitor has seen them cache food, 
and they have themselves had the experience of pilfering others’ caches, they re-cache in private [1]. If 
privacy is denied them, they prefer to cache behind barriers, and if there are none they choose ill-lit spots 
furthest from the competitor [2]. Denied all these options, they fall back on a strategy of confusion, multiply 
re-caching their foods. These behaviours make good sense, and are easily described in mental-state terms: 
the jay knows from its own experience how easily a cache can be pilfered by a bird that has seen it made, so 
tries to keep its competitors ignorant of its own cache sites. In doing so, it takes account of a particular 
competitor’s viewpoint and clarity of vision, and — remembering what a particular competitor is likely to 
have seen — aims to devalue 
that knowledge by re-caching somewhere they can’t see, or at least confusing the issue by re-caching many 
times.  
In psychology, the ability to model the knowledge and beliefs of others, as distinct from one’s own, is called 
‘theory of mind’ [3]. Theory of mind develops slowly in children and may be impaired in autism [4]. Because 
theory of mind is fundamental to linguistic communication, the attainment has often been thought a crucial 
step in recent human evolution; but if a bird possesses the same capacity, then our ideas about its evolution 
will need revising. It is possible, however, to interpret the bird’s behaviour quite differently: that it is the 
consequence of a complex web of associations, each association acquired according to principles well-
understood from laboratory study of learning in the white rat. This sort of explanation is sometimes 
described as conditioning; ‘behaviourism’ is the philosophy that all learning is fundamentally of this 
associative nature, even in cases where we experience accompanying mental images and thoughts that seem 
to suggest otherwise.  
To make associative explanations work for such elaborate behaviour patterns, one must take quite a bit on 
trust. Learning would have to be rapid compared to that of the average laboratory rat, and sharply focused 
on just those specific features that cure the variables important in explaining how a particular behaviour was 
learnt. When extended to behaviour of the kind that suggests understanding, in natural environments 
crowded with distracting features that may all be salient for survival in other ways, associative learning 
accounts can sometimes appear unduly trusting. The attraction, to animal learning theorists, is the chance to 
de-mystify. Association learning avoids postulating mental states — there is no talk of understanding 
another’s viewpoint, remembering what it saw, and so on — so explanation is grounded in simple 
phenomena, such as associating two events that often occur together in time and space or repeating 
behaviour that has previously led to reward. Learning theorists have shown considerable ingenuity in 
devising associative accounts of apparently impressive, even intellectual, feats of animal behaviour [5,6]. 
Moreover, the fact that the nervous system undoubtedly does involve synaptic connections of variable 
relative strengths forming a complex web of linkages 
has encouraged the idea that associative learning is the only right and proper way to understand animal 
behaviour [7].  
Unfortunately, associative accounts can only be tested experimentally in tightly constrained and simplified 
cases: extension to the complexity of the natural worlds of animals, even that of a jay’s food-caching in the 
laboratory, tends to be a matter of post hoc explanation, as in historical sciences, rather than being usefully 
predictive. Of course, psychologists who study associative learning do experimentally test the predictions 
made by their theories: but the prediction and testing is local to the confines of highly artificial experimental 
situations. It is a matter of conviction, not open to verification, when associative learning is extended to 
account for the many complex and flexible traits observed under natural conditions [8]. The problem can 
only get worse as explanation moves from the minutiae of single experiments and single adaptive traits to 
the mentality 
of the animal as a whole [9]. The tempting economy or ‘parsimony’ of postulating only simple theoretical 
entities needs to be balanced against the power and scope of explanation over the whole range of an 
animal’s abilities: the apparent simplicity of association theory can soon lead to unmanageable complexity in 
explaining real life.  
What is needed is another level of explanation, between the massive complexity of the neural networks of 
the brain, and the simple efficiency of adaptive behaviour in the world. This is where cognitive explanation 
comes in: cognition offers an interlingua between brain and behaviour [10]. Using the conceptual tools of 
cognitive science — theory of mind, working memory, focus of attention, cognitive map, number concept 
and counting, procedural knowledge, problem-solving, and many others — allows theories to be developed, 
simple enough to be comprehended and used to make testable predictions in natural environments, yet 
tight enough to be mapped precisely onto observed behaviour. (In principle, cognitive explanations can also 
be meshed with brain structures, but in animal work this is in practice more often a hope for the future, 
waiting for developments in imaging that can be used under relatively natural conditions.)  
An everyday analogy may be made with our understanding of how a television works. There is no doubt that 
its ‘behaviour’ — showing moving images of things happening at other places and times — is fundamentally 
caused by the electronics. However, handing us a full circuit diagram would seldom be educationally helpful. 
Rather, what is needed is an intervening level of explanation, in which it can be explained that images are 
sliced up, salami-fashion, then relayed as a linear signal, travelling near-instantaneously along wires as 
electric waves and across space as radio waves, finally re-assembled by the electronics of the set. Only with 
the aid of this ‘cognitive model’ can one start to discuss intelligently the origin of that odd flicker or 
annoying stripe on the picture, and begin to decide whether it relates to characteristics of the set, the aerial, 
or the transmitter. The same applies in biology. For an animal as simple as the sea-slug Aplysia, with under 
20,000 neurons, many of them very large, expecting to explain behaviour directly by tracing neural 
connections is feasible [11]. But for vertebrates, the combinatorial explosion of possible neural 
interconnections in the vastly larger brain renders this an impractical task. Indeed, even Aplysia has a wider 
range of behaviour than is understood at the neural level, and a cognitive approach may yet prove useful for 
this species too.  
In behavioural biology, a fundamental goal is to map between brain and behaviour, and the cognitive level 
of explanation provides an effective tool for doing so. However, cognitive models can be instantiated in 
material other than flesh and blood: indeed, the origins of modern cognitive neuroscience lie in the 
development of ‘intelligent machines’ by Alan Turing and others. Just as a computer program can be run 
with solid state electronics, or with valves and resistors, or even hydraulic components, so also cognitive 
models of mental function are semi-independent of hardware. Relying on this freedom, some psychologists 
have extensively used digital computers to test their cognitive models, as simulations in which the blow-by-
blow behaviour of the machine and the human can be compared for match — for example, chessplaying, 
formal logic and developmental stage-transitions in children’s understanding [12,13]. Modern psychology 
relies almost entirely on cognitive models of behaviour; although few are explicitly tested as simulations, 
clear and testable predictions can nevertheless be made from these theories, because they are expressed at 
the ‘systems level’ of cognition.  
The cognitive level of explanation has proved versatile for understanding human behaviour, and in the next 
few years we can expect see this extended throughout behavioural biology. Already, it is no coincidence that 
some of the most exciting discoveries in animal behaviour of recent years have begun from a cognitive 
perspective. As one example, consider the numerical abilities of animals. Chimpanzees, taught the cardinal 
numbers as Arabic numerals, have proved able to compute simple sums with no explicit training of ordinal 
number; and knowing numbers extends their abilities [14]. Chimpanzees cannot normally succeed in a task in 
which the rule is: whichever of two piles of food you point to, your companion gets, and you are left with 
the other. Trial after 
trial, a chimpanzee will point to the largest pile, only to be frustrated by the outcome: they simply cannot 
inhibit their natural attraction to the desired goal. But if Arabic numbers are substituted, they immediately 
solve the problem and switch to the lower number; if the test reverts to real entities, they again fail.  
A grey parrot, Alex, has been taught various human words to facilitate study of its abilities: being a parrot, it 
is able to speak, but Alex understands appropriate word use rather than merely ‘parroting’ the words [15]. 
This has enabled precise testing of Alex’s understanding of number. After learning numbers as labels for 
quantities, he was tested with more complicated arrays of objects: for instance, several blocks and several 
balls, each coming in two different colours. He was reliably able to answer questions about the size of a 
specific subset, such as ‘How many green balls?’, and showed that he understood verbal information of the 
same sort [16]. This would be an impressive ability for a three-year old child, and it may be that psittacine 
birds are innately equipped with mathematical concepts that the child only develops slowly during an 
extended series of interactions with adults.  
By questioning whether animals possess or can acquire concepts like ordinal and cardinal number, relative 
and absolute numerosity, set membership and overlap, these and other fascinating experiments [17] have 
revealed hidden depths to how animals count the world. No doubt, now that these data are known, learning 
theorists will manage to devise associative accounts to explain the animals’ abilities. The point is not that any 
particular animal feat will ‘disprove’ association learning; in fact, associative explanations of realistically 
complex phenomena are worryingly unfalsifiable. Rather, it is quite unclear how the topic of number and 
counting could ever have been explored from a standpoint of animal learning theory; and just the same 
applies to many other current topics in animal behaviour, including social comprehension, spatial knowledge 
and navigation, imitation and teaching, and everyday understanding of physical systems such as tool use or 
weather. The advantage 
of using a cognitive level of description is that it tends to lead to interesting experiments, novel regimes of 
observation, and theories of naturally adaptive behaviour that can be tested and refined.  
Why does any of this need saying, if the advantages of treating animals as cognitive systems are so clear? 
Where’s the controversy? We suspect that the reluctance of biologists to embrace cognitive explanation 
stems from the elision — in much of the popular and even some scientific writing on animal abilities — 
between cognition, intelligence and consciousness. The tacit assumption is often made that, if behaviour is 
best understood as the result of cognitive processes, the animal is showing more intelligence than if an 
account in terms of association learning will suffice. In fact, ascription of more or less intelligence to animal 
species is seldom useful, as there is no reliable scale of intellectual differences [18]. Among humans, 
intelligence measurements are expressed statistically in terms of a reference population’s test scores, 
calibrated against educational achievement. Nothing like that exists for animals, and our everyday 
judgements of animal ‘smartness’ are usually based on how well an animal’s social system and 
communicative modality mesh with our own. Worse, the use of cognitive explanation seems to bring a whiff 
of consciousness along with it.  
For those keen to improve animal welfare, this may be manna; while for anyone trained in the dry theorems 
of animal learning it is anathema, reason enough to strive desperately for an associative counter-explanation. 
But neither attitude is justified: despite years of fascination with the biological function and brain localization 
of human consciousness, cognitive theory neither needs nor explains consciousness [19]. Animal 
consciousness is a fascinating area of debate, but not one likely to be resolved by empirical evidence. 
Although the root meaning of cognition is thinking, and to many people thinking is a quintessentially 
conscious activity, from a cognitive perspective thinking is simply a mechanistic, computational process 
recognizable by its products: thinking enables the thinker to ‘go beyond the information given’. The 
cognitive revolution in behavioural and brain sciences was a direct product of the development of 
computing machines by Alan Turing and others, and the resulting de-mystification of ‘mental’ processes. Of 
course, mental states and operations had been discussed for millennia (thought, intention, and reminiscence 
are not new terms), but from the new cognitive perspective all mental operations were seen as information 
processing. The brain came to be viewed as a device that converts information from one code to another 
(e.g. from visual to phonological code, when we read silently), stores and retrieves information (from the 
fleeting traces of immediate visual memory to the laborious recall of events in one’s distant past), and 
operates upon existing information to compute new ‘knowledge’ (planning future activities and solving 
problems). A cognitive approach to animal behaviour aims to answer ‘how’ questions [20], deriving and 
testing mechanistic theories couched in information processing terms rather than phenomenology, and thus 
explore the variety of cognitive systems that exist in different species of animal.  
Treating animals as cognitive systems is therefore not an approach that should be reserved for the most 
flexible and human-like species, while the behaviour of simpler animals is safely explained as ‘merely’ innate 
or as learned by association (Figure 1). Indeed, whether an animal’s behaviour is cognitive, and thus by 
implication ‘clever’, or associatively learnt is not an empirical question at all. These are simply two different 
ways of studying the same behaviour, and in the complex natural environments of most species only the 
cognitive approach leads to testable predictions.  
Why are animals cognitive? One answer is that studying animal behaviour cognitively offers the best chance 
of understanding the evolution of our own mind — tracing the history of cognition in primate evolution. 
More generally, the cognitive approach offers the only possibility of dealing scientifically with cases of 
flexible and sophisticated behavioural abilities in animals, which may prove more widespread in nature than 
is sometimes obvious from our necessarily anthropocentric viewpoint [21]. This is important, because 
charting the range of independently evolved, advanced cognitive capacities in many taxa can provide 
evidence of the biological utility and evolutionary origins of cognition.  
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Figure 1. Co-operative hunting has been described in a wide range of animal species: but are similar psychological 
processes operat- ing in each case?  
(A,B) Parties of (usually) male chimpanzees Pan troglodytes hunt monkeys, especially colobines, and share the meat 
extensively with other group members after a kill. Chimpanzee hunting is difficult to observe clearly in their dense, three-
dimensional rainforest habitat, but has been claimed to involve rich understanding of the process of co-operation [22], 
with individuals taking mutually in- terlocking roles, for example ‘driver’, ‘blocker’ and ‘ambusher’, although this remains 
controversial [23]. (C) Harris’ hawks Parabuteo unicinctus also hunt cooperatively [24]. Extended families of hawks pursue 
and kill mammals, particularly rabbits, and it appears to observers that some individuals pursue the prey while others 
block its escape. (D) Pseudoscorpions are able to kill prey vastly larger than themselves by co-operation [25]; in this 
illustration, Paratemnoides nidificator individuals are attacking the vespid wasp Apoica pallens at the Asa Wright Nature 
Center, Trinidad. Cognitive analyses have not been applied to co-operative hunting in birds or ar- thropods: the 
assumption seems to be that chimpanzees may ‘behave cognitively’, whereas other animals can always be explained by 
simpler processes. This categorization is no more likely to be helpful in biology than those other binary divisions, such as 
innate versus learned, or insightful versus automatic, generally seen now as simplistic and misleading. Instead, to make 
progress it is es- sential to model the competence of each species in the same terms: and these can only be cognitive.  
 
